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Diffstat (limited to 'prebuilts/api/32.0/private/untrusted_app_all.te')
| -rw-r--r-- | prebuilts/api/32.0/private/untrusted_app_all.te | 177 |
1 files changed, 177 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/32.0/private/untrusted_app_all.te b/prebuilts/api/32.0/private/untrusted_app_all.te new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6064c1453 --- /dev/null +++ b/prebuilts/api/32.0/private/untrusted_app_all.te @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +### +### Untrusted_app_all. +### +### This file defines the rules shared by all untrusted app domains except +### ephemeral_app for instant apps and isolated_app (which has a reduced +### permission set). +### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and +### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID +### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data +### directory). The untrusted_app_all attribute is assigned to all default +### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000) +### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo +### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml. In current AOSP, this +### attribute is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps +### that are not signed by the platform key. To move +### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to +### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values +### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and +### seapp_contexts. +### +### Note that rules that should apply to all untrusted apps must be in app.te or also +### added to ephemeral_app.te. + +# Some apps ship with shared libraries and binaries that they write out +# to their sandbox directory and then execute. +allow untrusted_app_all privapp_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute }; +allow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute }; +auditallow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:file execute; + +# Chrome Crashpad uses the the dynamic linker to load native executables +# from an APK (b/112050209, crbug.com/928422) +allow untrusted_app_all system_linker_exec:file execute_no_trans; + +# Follow priv-app symlinks. This is used for dynamite functionality. +allow untrusted_app_all privapp_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms; + +# Allow handling of less common filesystem objects +allow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:{ lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } create_file_perms; + +# Allow loading and deleting executable shared libraries +# within an application home directory. Such shared libraries would be +# created by things like renderscript or via other mechanisms. +allow untrusted_app_all app_exec_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute unlink }; + +# ASEC +allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms; +allow untrusted_app_all asec_apk_file:dir r_dir_perms; +# Execute libs in asec containers. +allow untrusted_app_all asec_public_file:file { execute }; + +# Used by Finsky / Android "Verify Apps" functionality when +# running "adb install foo.apk". +# TODO: Long term, we don't want apps probing into shell data files. +# Figure out a way to remove these rules. +allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:file r_file_perms; +allow untrusted_app_all shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; + +# Allow traceur to pass file descriptors through a content provider to untrusted apps +# for the purpose of sharing files through e.g. gmail +allow untrusted_app_all trace_data_file:file { getattr read }; + +# untrusted apps should not be able to open trace data files, they should depend +# upon traceur to pass a file descriptor +neverallow untrusted_app_all trace_data_file:dir *; +neverallow untrusted_app_all trace_data_file:file { no_w_file_perms open }; + +# neverallow untrusted apps accessing debugfs_tracing +neverallow untrusted_app_all debugfs_tracing:file no_rw_file_perms; + +# Allow to read staged apks. +allow untrusted_app_all { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file {read getattr}; + +# Read and write system app data files passed over Binder. +# Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for +# cropping or taking user photos. +allow untrusted_app_all system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr }; + +# +# Rules migrated from old app domains coalesced into untrusted_app. +# This includes what used to be media_app, shared_app, and release_app. +# + +# Access to /data/media. +allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms; +allow untrusted_app_all media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms; + +# allow cts to query all services +allow untrusted_app_all servicemanager:service_manager list; + +allow untrusted_app_all audioserver_service:service_manager find; +allow untrusted_app_all cameraserver_service:service_manager find; +allow untrusted_app_all drmserver_service:service_manager find; +allow untrusted_app_all mediaserver_service:service_manager find; +allow untrusted_app_all mediaextractor_service:service_manager find; +allow untrusted_app_all mediametrics_service:service_manager find; +allow untrusted_app_all mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find; +allow untrusted_app_all nfc_service:service_manager find; +allow untrusted_app_all radio_service:service_manager find; +allow untrusted_app_all app_api_service:service_manager find; +allow untrusted_app_all vr_manager_service:service_manager find; + +# gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process. +allow untrusted_app_all self:process ptrace; + +# Android Studio Instant Run has the application connect to a +# runas_app socket listening in the abstract namespace. +# https://developer.android.com/studio/run/ +# b/123297648 +allow untrusted_app_all runas_app:unix_stream_socket connectto; + +# Untrusted apps need to be able to send a SIGCHLD to runas_app +# when running under a debugger (b/123612207) +allow untrusted_app_all runas_app:process sigchld; + +# Cts: HwRngTest +allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:dir search; +allow untrusted_app_all sysfs_hwrandom:file r_file_perms; + +# Allow apps to view preloaded media content +allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms; +allow untrusted_app_all preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms; +allow untrusted_app_all preloads_data_file:dir search; + +# Allow untrusted apps read / execute access to /vendor/app for there can +# be pre-installed vendor apps that package a library within themselves. +# TODO (b/37784178) Consider creating a special type for /vendor/app installed +# apps. +allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:dir { open getattr read search }; +allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:file { r_file_perms execute }; +allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:lnk_file { open getattr read }; + +# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires +# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd. +perfetto_producer(untrusted_app_all) + +# Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable. +can_profile_heap(untrusted_app_all) +can_profile_perf(untrusted_app_all) + +# allow untrusted apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not +# modify them other than to connect +allow untrusted_app_all system_server:udp_socket { + connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt }; + +# Allow the renderscript compiler to be run. +domain_auto_trans(untrusted_app_all, rs_exec, rs) + +# suppress denials caused by debugfs_tracing +dontaudit untrusted_app_all debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms; + +# This is allowed for targetSdkVersion <= 25 but disallowed on newer versions. +dontaudit untrusted_app_all net_dns_prop:file read; + +# These have been disallowed since Android O. +# For P, we assume that apps are safely handling the denial. +dontaudit untrusted_app_all proc_stat:file read; +dontaudit untrusted_app_all proc_vmstat:file read; +dontaudit untrusted_app_all proc_uptime:file read; + +# Allow the allocation and use of ptys +# Used by: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm +create_pty(untrusted_app_all) + +# Allow access to kcov via its ioctl interface for coverage +# guided kernel fuzzing. +userdebug_or_eng(` + allow untrusted_app_all debugfs_kcov:file rw_file_perms; + allowxperm untrusted_app_all debugfs_kcov:file ioctl { KCOV_INIT_TRACE KCOV_ENABLE KCOV_DISABLE }; + # The use of debugfs kcov is considered a breach of the kernel integrity + # according to the heuristic of lockdown. + allow untrusted_app_all self:lockdown integrity; +') + +# Allow signalling simpleperf domain, which is the domain that the simpleperf +# profiler runs as when executed by the app. The signals are used to control +# the profiler (which would be profiling the app that is sending the signal). +allow untrusted_app_all simpleperf:process signal; |