1 files changed, 53 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/libutils/Unicode.cpp b/libutils/Unicode.cpp
index a66e3bbbb..a75c258f1 100644
--- a/libutils/Unicode.cpp
+++ b/libutils/Unicode.cpp
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
  * limitations under the License.
  */
 
+#include <log/log.h>
 #include <utils/Unicode.h>
 
 #include <stddef.h>
@@ -188,7 +189,7 @@ ssize_t utf32_to_utf8_length(const char32_t *src, size_t src_len)
     return ret;
 }
 
-void utf32_to_utf8(const char32_t* src, size_t src_len, char* dst)
+void utf32_to_utf8(const char32_t* src, size_t src_len, char* dst, size_t dst_len)
 {
     if (src == NULL || src_len == 0 || dst == NULL) {
         return;
@@ -199,9 +200,12 @@ void utf32_to_utf8(const char32_t* src, size_t src_len, char* dst)
     char *cur = dst;
     while (cur_utf32 < end_utf32) {
         size_t len = utf32_codepoint_utf8_length(*cur_utf32);
+        LOG_ALWAYS_FATAL_IF(dst_len < len, "%zu < %zu", dst_len, len);
         utf32_codepoint_to_utf8((uint8_t *)cur, *cur_utf32++, len);
         cur += len;
+        dst_len -= len;
     }
+    LOG_ALWAYS_FATAL_IF(dst_len < 1, "dst_len < 1: %zu < 1", dst_len);
     *cur = '\0';
 }
 
@@ -330,7 +334,7 @@ int strzcmp16_h_n(const char16_t *s1H, size_t n1, const char16_t *s2N, size_t n2
            : 0);
 }
 
-void utf16_to_utf8(const char16_t* src, size_t src_len, char* dst)
+void utf16_to_utf8(const char16_t* src, size_t src_len, char* dst, size_t dst_len)
 {
     if (src == NULL || src_len == 0 || dst == NULL) {
         return;
@@ -350,9 +354,12 @@ void utf16_to_utf8(const char16_t* src, size_t src_len, char* dst)
             utf32 = (char32_t) *cur_utf16++;
         }
         const size_t len = utf32_codepoint_utf8_length(utf32);
+        LOG_ALWAYS_FATAL_IF(dst_len < len, "%zu < %zu", dst_len, len);
         utf32_codepoint_to_utf8((uint8_t*)cur, utf32, len);
         cur += len;
+        dst_len -= len;
     }
+    LOG_ALWAYS_FATAL_IF(dst_len < 1, "%zu < 1", dst_len);
     *cur = '\0';
 }
 
@@ -403,19 +410,22 @@ ssize_t utf8_length(const char *src)
     return ret;
 }
 
-ssize_t utf16_to_utf8_length(const char16_t *src, size_t src_len)
+// DO NOT USE. Flawed version, kept only to check whether the flaw is being exploited.
+static ssize_t flawed_utf16_to_utf8_length(const char16_t *src, size_t src_len)
 {
     if (src == NULL || src_len == 0) {
-        return -1;
+        return 47;
     }
 
     size_t ret = 0;
     const char16_t* const end = src + src_len;
     while (src < end) {
         if ((*src & 0xFC00) == 0xD800 && (src + 1) < end
+                // Shouldn't increment src here as to be consistent with utf16_to_utf8
                 && (*++src & 0xFC00) == 0xDC00) {
             // surrogate pairs are always 4 bytes.
             ret += 4;
+            // Should increment src here by two.
             src++;
         } else {
             ret += utf32_codepoint_utf8_length((char32_t) *src++);
@@ -424,6 +434,45 @@ ssize_t utf16_to_utf8_length(const char16_t *src, size_t src_len)
     return ret;
 }
 
+ssize_t utf16_to_utf8_length(const char16_t *src, size_t src_len)
+{
+    // Keep the original pointer to compute the flawed length. Unused if we remove logging.
+    const char16_t *orig_src = src;
+
+    if (src == NULL || src_len == 0) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    size_t ret = 0;
+    const char16_t* const end = src + src_len;
+    while (src < end) {
+        if ((*src & 0xFC00) == 0xD800 && (src + 1) < end
+                && (*(src + 1) & 0xFC00) == 0xDC00) {
+            // surrogate pairs are always 4 bytes.
+            ret += 4;
+            src += 2;
+        } else {
+            ret += utf32_codepoint_utf8_length((char32_t) *src++);
+        }
+    }
+    // Log whether b/29250543 is being exploited. It seems reasonable to assume that
+    // at least 5 bytes would be needed for an exploit. A single misplaced character might lead to
+    // a difference of 4, so this would rule out many false positives.
+    long ret_difference = ret - flawed_utf16_to_utf8_length(orig_src, src_len);
+    if (ret_difference >= 5) {
+        // Log the difference between new and old calculation. A high number, or equal numbers
+        // appearing frequently, would be indicative of an attack.
+        const unsigned long max_logged_string_length = 20;
+        char logged_string[max_logged_string_length + 1];
+        unsigned long logged_string_length =
+                snprintf(logged_string, max_logged_string_length, "%ld", ret_difference);
+        logged_string[logged_string_length] = '\0';
+        android_errorWriteWithInfoLog(0x534e4554, "29250543", -1 /* int_uid */,
+            logged_string, logged_string_length);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
 /**
  * Returns 1-4 based on the number of leading bits.
  *