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authorChad Brubaker <cbrubaker@google.com>2017-01-05 15:51:41 -0800
committerChad Brubaker <cbrubaker@google.com>2017-01-20 11:03:53 -0800
commit97bccee6d640a62c78676b5e2a1eb3bbe29072af (patch)
treea61b632c40718605b012e7ceee61c1f551b7d4e3 /rs/java/android/renderscript/ProgramFragmentFixedFunction.java
parent1f6df68a90c6aa02ed21e8ed2753f9d2488880c8 (diff)
Add ephemeral whitelist for SettingsProvider
Currently the list is small, only whats required to launch a basic ephemeral app. It will expand in followup CLs. Note that the goal of this is not to completely shut down all ways that an ephemeral app could learn the value (or part of) of a setting not in the set. The goal is to limit the raw access to settings to a small set that includes settings that ephemeral apps should have access to directly System APIs that are exposed to ephemeral apps may allow for ephemeral apps to learn the value of settings not in the directly exposed set and that is OK and _not_ a security issue. This contains a hack to support code in system system server that in the process of a binder transaction reads a setting using a ContentReceiver with a system package name. This was previously not an issue but causes an exception to be thrown from getCallingPackage which reading a setting now calls. Bug: 33349998 Test: Boots, functions as normal for regular apps. Test: cts-tradefed run cts -m CtsProviderTestCases -t android.provider.cts.SettingsTest Change-Id: Icc839b0d98c725d23cdd395e8cb76a7b293f8767
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