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-rw-r--r--monitor.c1477
1 files changed, 673 insertions, 804 deletions
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 2947eb0c..b454cc16 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.145 2015/02/20 22:17:21 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.210 2020/03/13 03:17:07 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -29,18 +29,18 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
-#include <stdint.h>
+# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -55,32 +55,25 @@
# endif
#endif
-#ifdef SKEY
-#include <skey.h>
-#endif
-
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "dh.h"
-#ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC /* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */
-#undef TARGET_OS_MAC
-#include "zlib.h"
-#define TARGET_OS_MAC 1
-#else
-#include "zlib.h"
-#endif
+#include "auth-pam.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
@@ -92,7 +85,6 @@
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "monitor.h"
-#include "monitor_mm.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
@@ -100,10 +92,10 @@
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "roaming.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
@@ -113,69 +105,63 @@ static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
extern ServerOptions options;
extern u_int utmp_len;
extern u_char session_id[];
-extern Buffer auth_debug;
-extern int auth_debug_init;
-extern Buffer loginmsg;
+extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
/* State exported from the child */
static struct sshbuf *child_state;
/* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
-int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_skeyquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_skeyrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_term(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_response(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_sesskey(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_sessid(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
#ifdef USE_PAM
-int mm_answer_pam_start(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_pam_account(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_pam_query(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_pam_respond(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pam_start(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pam_account(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pam_query(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pam_respond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
-int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
#endif
-static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
-
static Authctxt *authctxt;
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
-#endif
-
/* local state for key verify */
static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
-static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
+static size_t key_bloblen = 0;
static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
+static struct sshauthopt *key_opts = NULL;
static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
static char *auth_method = "unknown";
@@ -187,7 +173,7 @@ static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
struct mon_table {
enum monitor_reqtype type;
int flags;
- int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
+ int (*f)(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
};
#define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
@@ -199,6 +185,10 @@ struct mon_table {
#define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
+static int monitor_read(struct ssh *, struct monitor *, struct mon_table *,
+ struct mon_table **);
+static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
+
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
@@ -211,9 +201,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
#ifdef USE_PAM
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 0, mm_answer_pam_query},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_respond},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
@@ -223,17 +213,13 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
{MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
{MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
#endif
-#ifdef SKEY
- {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
-#endif
{MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
{MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
#ifdef GSSAPI
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
@@ -253,56 +239,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
{0, 0, NULL}
};
-struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
- {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
- {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
- {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
- {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
- {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
- {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
- {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
-#endif
-#ifdef SKEY
- {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
-#endif
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-#endif
-#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
- {0, 0, NULL}
-};
-
-struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
- {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
- {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
-#endif
-#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
- {0, 0, NULL}
-};
-
struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
-
static void
monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
{
@@ -331,46 +270,42 @@ monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
}
void
-monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
struct mon_table *ent;
int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
debug3("preauth child monitor started");
- close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
- close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
+ if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
+ close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+ if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0)
+ close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
- authctxt = _authctxt;
+ authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
+ ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
- authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
+ authctxt->loginmsg = loginmsg;
- if (compat20) {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
-
- /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
-
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
- }
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
+ /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
while (!authenticated) {
partial = 0;
auth_method = "unknown";
auth_submethod = NULL;
- authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
+ auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt);
+
+ authenticated = (monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor,
+ mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
/* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
- if (!compat20)
- fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
- "with SSH protocol 1");
if (authenticated &&
!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
@@ -386,26 +321,33 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
__func__, ent->type);
if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
- !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
+ !auth_root_allowed(ssh, auth_method))
authenticated = 0;
#ifdef USE_PAM
/* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */
if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
- Buffer m;
+ struct sshbuf *m;
- buffer_init(&m);
+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed",
+ __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
- authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
- buffer_free(&m);
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
+ authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account(
+ ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
+ sshbuf_free(m);
}
#endif
}
if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
- auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial,
+ auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial,
auth_method, auth_submethod);
- if (!authenticated)
+ if (!partial && !authenticated)
authctxt->failures++;
+ if (authenticated || partial) {
+ auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
+ auth_method, auth_submethod);
+ }
}
}
@@ -416,15 +358,19 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
__func__, authctxt->user);
+ ssh->authctxt = NULL;
+ ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
- mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
+ mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
;
- close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
- close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
+ if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
+ close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+ if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0)
+ close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
}
@@ -441,84 +387,53 @@ monitor_child_handler(int sig)
}
void
-monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
- signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
- signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
- signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
#ifdef SIGXFSZ
- signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN);
+ ssh_signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN);
#endif
- if (compat20) {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
- /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
- }
- if (!no_pty_flag) {
+ /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+
+ if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
}
for (;;)
- monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
-}
-
-void
-monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
-{
- if (options.compression) {
- /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
- mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
- }
-}
-
-/* Allocation functions for zlib */
-static void *
-mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
-{
- size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
- void *address;
-
- if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_MAX / size)
- fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
-
- address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
-
- return (address);
-}
-
-static void
-mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
-{
- mm_free(mm, address);
+ monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
}
static int
monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
- Buffer logmsg;
+ struct sshbuf *logmsg;
u_int len, level;
char *msg;
+ u_char *p;
+ int r;
- buffer_init(&logmsg);
+ if ((logmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
/* Read length */
- buffer_append_space(&logmsg, 4);
- if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
- buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, 4, &p)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, 4) != 4) {
if (errno == EPIPE) {
- buffer_free(&logmsg);
+ sshbuf_free(logmsg);
debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
@@ -526,37 +441,39 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
}
fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
- len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: get len: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
/* Read severity, message */
- buffer_clear(&logmsg);
- buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len);
- if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
- buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg))
+ sshbuf_reset(logmsg);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, len, &p)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, len) != len)
fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &level)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Log it */
- level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
- msg = buffer_get_string(&logmsg, NULL);
if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
__func__, level);
do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
- buffer_free(&logmsg);
+ sshbuf_free(logmsg);
free(msg);
return 0;
}
-int
-monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
+static int
+monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
struct mon_table **pent)
{
- Buffer m;
- int ret;
+ struct sshbuf *m;
+ int r, ret;
u_char type;
struct pollfd pfd[2];
@@ -583,10 +500,12 @@ monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
break; /* Continues below */
}
- buffer_init(&m);
+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
- mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
- type = buffer_get_char(&m);
+ mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &type)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
@@ -600,8 +519,8 @@ monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
type);
- ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
- buffer_free(&m);
+ ret = (*ent->f)(ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
+ sshbuf_free(m);
/* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
@@ -624,7 +543,7 @@ monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
/* allowed key state */
static int
-monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
+monitor_allowed_key(const u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
{
/* make sure key is allowed */
if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
@@ -640,23 +559,28 @@ monitor_reset_key_state(void)
free(key_blob);
free(hostbased_cuser);
free(hostbased_chost);
+ sshauthopt_free(key_opts);
key_blob = NULL;
key_bloblen = 0;
key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
+ key_opts = NULL;
hostbased_cuser = NULL;
hostbased_chost = NULL;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
int
-mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
DH *dh;
- int min, want, max;
+ const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
+ int r;
+ u_int min, want, max;
- min = buffer_get_int(m);
- want = buffer_get_int(m);
- max = buffer_get_int(m);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &min)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &want)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &max)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
__func__, min, want, max);
@@ -665,17 +589,20 @@ mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
__func__, min, want, max);
- buffer_clear(m);
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
if (dh == NULL) {
- buffer_put_char(m, 0);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return (0);
} else {
/* Send first bignum */
- buffer_put_char(m, 1);
- buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
- buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
+ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_p)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_g)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
DH_free(dh);
}
@@ -685,23 +612,27 @@ mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
#endif
int
-mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */
struct sshkey *key;
- struct sshbuf *sigbuf;
- u_char *p;
- u_char *signature;
- size_t datlen, siglen;
- int r, keyid, is_proof = 0;
+ struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
+ u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+ char *alg = NULL;
+ size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
+ int r, is_proof = 0;
+ u_int keyid, compat;
const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0)
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &compat)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (keyid > INT_MAX)
+ fatal("%s: invalid key ID", __func__);
/*
* Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
@@ -727,7 +658,7 @@ mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
- session_id2_len) != 0) ||
+ session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key "
"proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
@@ -747,14 +678,14 @@ mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
}
if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
- if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen,
- datafellows)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
+ options.sk_provider, compat)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
auth_sock > 0) {
if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
- p, datlen, datafellows)) != 0) {
+ p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
@@ -762,12 +693,13 @@ mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__,
- is_proof ? "KEX" : "hostkey proof", signature, siglen);
+ is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", signature, siglen);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ free(alg);
free(p);
free(signature);
@@ -782,11 +714,11 @@ mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
int
-mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *username;
struct passwd *pwent;
- int allowed = 0;
+ int r, allowed = 0;
u_int i;
debug3("%s", __func__);
@@ -794,18 +726,20 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
- username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &username, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
+ pwent = getpwnamallow(ssh, username);
authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
free(username);
- buffer_clear(m);
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
if (pwent == NULL) {
- buffer_put_char(m, 0);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
authctxt->pw = fakepw();
goto out;
}
@@ -814,29 +748,40 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
authctxt->pw = pwent;
authctxt->valid = 1;
- buffer_put_char(m, 1);
- buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
- buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
- buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
+ /* XXX don't sent pwent to unpriv; send fake class/dir/shell too */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(*pwent))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "*")) != 0 ||
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
- buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos)) != 0 ||
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
- buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class)) != 0 ||
#endif
- buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
- buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
out:
- buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
+ ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
+ authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options))) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
- if (options.x != NULL) \
- buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x); \
+ if (options.x != NULL) { \
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \
+ __func__, ssh_err(r)); \
+ } \
} while (0)
#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
- for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \
- buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \
+ for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) { \
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x[i])) != 0) \
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \
+ __func__, ssh_err(r)); \
+ } \
} while (0)
/* See comment in servconf.h */
COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
@@ -844,7 +789,7 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
/* Create valid auth method lists */
- if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
+ if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
/*
* The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
* run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
@@ -856,14 +801,10 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
- /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
- if (!compat20)
- monitor_permit_authentications(1);
- else {
- /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
- }
+ /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
+
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
@@ -872,13 +813,15 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
return (0);
}
-int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
+int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *banner;
+ int r;
- buffer_clear(m);
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
banner = auth2_read_banner();
- buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "")) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
free(banner);
@@ -886,12 +829,15 @@ int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
}
int
-mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
+ int r;
+
monitor_permit_authentications(1);
- authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->service, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->style, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
__func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
@@ -903,28 +849,66 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
return (0);
}
+/*
+ * Check that the key type appears in the supplied pattern list, ignoring
+ * mismatches in the signature algorithm. (Signature algorithm checks are
+ * performed in the unprivileged authentication code).
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+key_base_type_match(const char *method, const struct sshkey *key,
+ const char *list)
+{
+ char *s, *l, *ol = xstrdup(list);
+ int found = 0;
+
+ l = ol;
+ for ((s = strsep(&l, ",")); s && *s != '\0'; (s = strsep(&l, ","))) {
+ if (sshkey_type_from_name(s) == key->type) {
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found) {
+ error("%s key type %s is not in permitted list %s", method,
+ sshkey_ssh_name(key), list);
+ }
+
+ free(ol);
+ return found;
+}
+
int
-mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
static int call_count;
+#if !defined(ANDROID)
char *passwd;
- int authenticated;
- u_int plen;
+#endif
+ int r, authenticated;
+ size_t plen = 0;
- passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
+ if (!options.password_authentication)
+ fatal("%s: password authentication not enabled", __func__);
#if !defined(ANDROID)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &passwd, &plen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
- auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
+ auth_password(ssh, passwd);
+ freezero(passwd, plen);
#else
/* no password authentication in Android. */
authenticated = 0;
#endif
- explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
- free(passwd);
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached())) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+#endif
debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
@@ -941,21 +925,25 @@ mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
int
-mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *name, *infotxt;
- u_int numprompts;
- u_int *echo_on;
+ u_int numprompts, *echo_on, success;
char **prompts;
- u_int success;
+ int r;
+ if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
+ fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
&prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, success);
- if (success)
- buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, success)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (success) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[0])) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
@@ -971,81 +959,33 @@ mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
}
int
-mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *response;
- int authok;
+ int r, authok;
- if (authctxt->as == 0)
+ if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
+ fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ if (authctxt->as == NULL)
fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
- response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &response, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
authctxt->as = NULL;
debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
free(response);
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, authok);
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authok)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
- if (compat20) {
- auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
- auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
- } else
- auth_method = "bsdauth";
-
- return (authok != 0);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef SKEY
-int
-mm_answer_skeyquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- struct skey skey;
- char challenge[1024];
- u_int success;
-
- success = _compat_skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge,
- sizeof(challenge)) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, success);
- if (success)
- buffer_put_cstring(m, challenge);
-
- debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, m);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_skeyrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- char *response;
- int authok;
-
- response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-
- authok = (options.challenge_response_authentication &&
- authctxt->valid &&
- skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
- skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, response) != -1);
-
- free(response);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, authok);
-
- debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, m);
-
- auth_method = "skey";
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+ auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
return (authok != 0);
}
@@ -1053,30 +993,34 @@ mm_answer_skeyrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
#ifdef USE_PAM
int
-mm_answer_pam_start(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_pam_start(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
- start_pam(authctxt);
+ start_pam(ssh);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1);
+ if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, 1);
return (0);
}
int
-mm_answer_pam_account(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_pam_account(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_int ret;
+ int r;
if (!options.use_pam)
- fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
+ fatal("%s: PAM not enabled", __func__);
ret = do_pam_account();
- buffer_put_int(m, ret);
- buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
@@ -1087,49 +1031,62 @@ static void *sshpam_ctxt, *sshpam_authok;
extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
int
-mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
+ u_int ok = 0;
+ int r;
debug3("%s", __func__);
- authctxt->user = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
+ fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL)
+ fatal("%s: already called", __func__);
sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
sshpam_authok = NULL;
- buffer_clear(m);
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) {
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1);
- buffer_put_int(m, 1);
- } else {
- buffer_put_int(m, 0);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 1);
+ ok = 1;
}
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ok)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
return (0);
}
int
-mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_pam_query(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *name = NULL, *info = NULL, **prompts = NULL;
u_int i, num = 0, *echo_on = 0;
- int ret;
+ int r, ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
sshpam_authok = NULL;
- ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info, &num, &prompts, &echo_on);
+ if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: no context", __func__);
+ ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info,
+ &num, &prompts, &echo_on);
if (ret == 0 && num == 0)
sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL)
- ret = -1;
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, ret);
- buffer_put_cstring(m, name);
+ fatal("sshpam_device.query failed");
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, 1);
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, name)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, info)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached())) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, num)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(name);
- buffer_put_cstring(m, info);
free(info);
- buffer_put_int(m, num);
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
- buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[i]);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[i])) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, echo_on[i])) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(prompts[i]);
- buffer_put_int(m, echo_on[i]);
}
free(prompts);
free(echo_on);
@@ -1140,19 +1097,25 @@ mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m)
}
int
-mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_pam_respond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char **resp;
u_int i, num;
- int ret;
+ int r, ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
+ if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: no context", __func__);
sshpam_authok = NULL;
- num = buffer_get_int(m);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &num)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (num > 0) {
resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *));
- for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
- resp[i] = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &(resp[i]), NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp);
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
free(resp[i]);
@@ -1160,8 +1123,9 @@ mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
} else {
ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL);
}
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, ret);
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
auth_submethod = "pam";
@@ -1171,275 +1135,297 @@ mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
}
int
-mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
+ int r = sshpam_authok != NULL && sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt;
debug3("%s", __func__);
+ if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: no context", __func__);
(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
- buffer_clear(m);
+ sshpam_ctxt = sshpam_authok = NULL;
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
+ /* Allow another attempt */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, 1);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
auth_submethod = "pam";
- return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt);
+ return r;
}
#endif
int
-mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
- Key *key;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
char *cuser, *chost;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int bloblen;
+ u_int pubkey_auth_attempt;
enum mm_keytype type = 0;
- int allowed = 0;
+ int r, allowed = 0;
+ struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- type = buffer_get_int(m);
- cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
-
- key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
-
- if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
- (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
- fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshkey_froms(m, &key)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
/* These should not make it past the privsep child */
- if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
+ if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__);
switch (type) {
case MM_USERKEY:
- allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
- !auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key) &&
- match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
- options.pubkey_key_types,
- strlen(options.pubkey_key_types), 0) == 1 &&
- user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
- pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL);
auth_method = "publickey";
- if (options.pubkey_authentication && allowed != 1)
- auth_clear_options();
+ if (!options.pubkey_authentication)
+ break;
+ if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
+ break;
+ if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
+ options.pubkey_key_types))
+ break;
+ allowed = user_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, key,
+ pubkey_auth_attempt, &opts);
break;
case MM_HOSTKEY:
- allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
- match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
- options.hostbased_key_types,
- strlen(options.hostbased_key_types), 0) == 1 &&
- hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
+ auth_method = "hostbased";
+ if (!options.hostbased_authentication)
+ break;
+ if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
+ break;
+ if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
+ options.hostbased_key_types))
+ break;
+ allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw,
cuser, chost, key);
- pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key,
+ auth2_record_info(authctxt,
"client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
cuser, chost);
- auth_method = "hostbased";
break;
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
- case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
- key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
- allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
- auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
- cuser, chost, key);
- if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
- auth_clear_options();
- auth_method = "rsa";
- break;
-#endif
default:
fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
break;
}
}
- if (key != NULL)
- key_free(key);
+
+ debug3("%s: %s authentication%s: %s key is %s", __func__,
+ auth_method, pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test",
+ (key == NULL || !authctxt->valid) ? "invalid" : sshkey_type(key),
+ allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
+
+ auth2_record_key(authctxt, 0, key);
/* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
monitor_reset_key_state();
if (allowed) {
/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
- key_blob = blob;
- key_bloblen = bloblen;
+ if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &key_blob, &key_bloblen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
key_blobtype = type;
+ key_opts = opts;
hostbased_cuser = cuser;
hostbased_chost = chost;
} else {
/* Log failed attempt */
- auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
- free(blob);
+ auth_log(ssh, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
free(cuser);
free(chost);
}
+ sshkey_free(key);
- debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
- __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
- buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
-
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, allowed)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (opts != NULL && (r = sshauthopt_serialise(opts, m, 1)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: sshauthopt_serialise: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
- if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
+ if (!allowed)
+ sshauthopt_free(opts);
return (0);
}
static int
-monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+monitor_valid_userblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
- Buffer b;
- char *p, *userstyle;
- u_int len;
- int fail = 0;
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ const u_char *p;
+ char *userstyle, *cp;
+ size_t len;
+ u_char type;
+ int r, fail = 0;
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_from", __func__);
if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
- p = buffer_ptr(&b);
- len = buffer_len(&b);
+ p = sshbuf_ptr(b);
+ len = sshbuf_len(b);
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len < session_id2_len) ||
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
- buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, session_id2_len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len != session_id2_len) ||
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
- free(p);
}
- if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
fail++;
- p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
- if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
- logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
- userstyle, p);
+ if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
+ logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
+ "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
fail++;
}
free(userstyle);
- free(p);
- buffer_skip_string(&b);
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
- if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
- fail++;
- } else {
- p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
- if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
- fail++;
- free(p);
- if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
- fail++;
- buffer_skip_string(&b);
- }
- buffer_skip_string(&b);
- if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
+ free(cp);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (strcmp("publickey", cp) != 0)
fail++;
- buffer_free(&b);
+ free(cp);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (type == 0)
+ fail++;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */
+ (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ sshbuf_free(b);
return (fail == 0);
}
static int
-monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
- char *chost)
+monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
+ const char *cuser, const char *chost)
{
- Buffer b;
- char *p, *userstyle;
- u_int len;
- int fail = 0;
+ struct sshbuf *b;
+ const u_char *p;
+ char *cp, *userstyle;
+ size_t len;
+ int r, fail = 0;
+ u_char type;
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len != session_id2_len) ||
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
- free(p);
- if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
fail++;
- p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
- if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
- logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
- userstyle, p);
+ if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
+ logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
+ "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
fail++;
}
free(userstyle);
- free(p);
- buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */
- p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
- if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
+ free(cp);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (strcmp(cp, "hostbased") != 0)
fail++;
- free(p);
- buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */
- buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */
+ free(cp);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */
+ (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
- if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
- p[len - 1] = '\0';
- if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (((len = strlen(cp)) > 0) && cp[len - 1] == '.')
+ cp[len - 1] = '\0';
+ if (strcmp(cp, chost) != 0)
fail++;
- free(p);
+ free(cp);
/* verify client user */
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
- if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (strcmp(cp, cuser) != 0)
fail++;
- free(p);
+ free(cp);
- if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
+ if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
fail++;
- buffer_free(&b);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
return (fail == 0);
}
int
-mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
- Key *key;
- u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
- u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
- int verified = 0;
- int valid_data = 0;
-
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
- signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
- data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
+ struct sshkey *key;
+ const u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
+ char *sigalg = NULL, *fp = NULL;
+ size_t signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
+ int r, ret, req_presence = 0, valid_data = 0, encoded_ret;
+ struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
!monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
- key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
- if (key == NULL)
- fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
+ /* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */
+ if (*sigalg == '\0') {
+ free(sigalg);
+ sigalg = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX use sshkey_froms here; need to change key_blob, etc. */
+ if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, bloblen, &key)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: bad public key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
switch (key_blobtype) {
case MM_USERKEY:
valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
+ auth_method = "publickey";
break;
case MM_HOSTKEY:
valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
+ auth_method = "hostbased";
break;
default:
valid_data = 0;
@@ -1448,33 +1434,62 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
if (!valid_data)
fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
- verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
- debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
- __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
-
- /* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */
- if (verified == 1)
- auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
- else
- key_free(key);
-
- free(blob);
- free(signature);
- free(data);
-
- auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+
+ ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
+ sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
+ debug3("%s: %s %p signature %s%s%s", __func__, auth_method, key,
+ (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
+ (ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : "");
+
+ if (ret == 0 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY && sig_details != NULL) {
+ req_presence = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
+ PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) ||
+ !key_opts->no_require_user_presence;
+ if (req_presence &&
+ (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) == 0) {
+ error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s "
+ "port %d rejected: user presence "
+ "(authenticator touch) requirement not met ",
+ sshkey_type(key), fp,
+ authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
+ authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ }
+ }
+ auth2_record_key(authctxt, ret == 0, key);
+ if (key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
+ auth_activate_options(ssh, key_opts);
monitor_reset_key_state();
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, verified);
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+
+ /* encode ret != 0 as positive integer, since we're sending u32 */
+ encoded_ret = (ret != 0);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details != NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (sig_details != NULL) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sig_details->sk_counter)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details->sk_flags)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
- return (verified == 1);
+ free(sigalg);
+ free(fp);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+
+ return ret == 0;
}
static void
-mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
+mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
{
socklen_t fromlen;
struct sockaddr_storage from;
@@ -1485,16 +1500,16 @@ mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
*/
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
fromlen = sizeof(from);
- if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
- if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
- (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
+ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(255);
}
}
/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
- get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
(struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
}
@@ -1510,15 +1525,15 @@ mm_session_close(Session *s)
}
int
-mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
Session *s;
- int res, fd0;
+ int r, res, fd0;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
- buffer_clear(m);
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
s = session_new();
if (s == NULL)
goto error;
@@ -1530,21 +1545,23 @@ mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
goto error;
pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
- buffer_put_int(m, 1);
- buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* We need to trick ttyslot */
if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
- mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
+ mm_record_login(ssh, s, authctxt->pw);
/* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
close(0);
/* send messages generated by record_login */
- buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
- buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: put login message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
@@ -1553,7 +1570,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
/* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
- if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
+ if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (fd0 != 0)
error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
@@ -1571,209 +1588,32 @@ mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
error:
if (s != NULL)
mm_session_close(s);
- buffer_put_int(m, 0);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
return (0);
}
int
-mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
Session *s;
char *tty;
+ int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
- tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
mm_session_close(s);
- buffer_clear(m);
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
free(tty);
return (0);
}
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
int
-mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- BIGNUM *p;
- int rsafail;
-
- /* Turn off permissions */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
-
- if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-
- buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
-
- rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
- buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
-
- BN_clear_free(p);
-
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
-
- /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- int i;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
- fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
-
- /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- BIGNUM *client_n;
- Key *key = NULL;
- u_char *blob = NULL;
- u_int blen = 0;
- int allowed = 0;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- auth_method = "rsa";
- if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
- if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
- buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
- allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
- BN_clear_free(client_n);
- }
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
- buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
-
- /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
- monitor_reset_key_state();
-
- if (allowed && key != NULL) {
- key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */
- if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
- fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
- buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
-
- /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
- key_blob = blob;
- key_bloblen = blen;
- key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
- }
- if (key != NULL)
- key_free(key);
-
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
-
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- Key *key = NULL;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int blen;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- if (!authctxt->valid)
- fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
- if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
- fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
- if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
- fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
- if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
- if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
- fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
- key->type = KEY_RSA1;
- if (ssh1_challenge)
- BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
- ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
-
- debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
-
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
-
- free(blob);
- key_free(key);
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- Key *key = NULL;
- u_char *blob, *response;
- u_int blen, len;
- int success;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- if (!authctxt->valid)
- fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
- if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
-
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
- if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
- fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
- if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
- fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
- if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
- response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- if (len != 16)
- fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
- success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
-
- free(blob);
- key_free(key);
- free(response);
-
- auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
-
- /* reset state */
- BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
- ssh1_challenge = NULL;
- monitor_reset_key_state();
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, success);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
-
- return (success);
-}
-#endif
-
-int
-mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
+mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *req)
{
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
int res, status;
@@ -1781,7 +1621,7 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
/* The child is terminating */
- session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
+ session_destroy_all(ssh, &mm_session_close);
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
@@ -1801,14 +1641,18 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/* Report that an audit event occurred */
int
-mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
{
+ u_int n;
ssh_audit_event_t event;
+ int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
- event = buffer_get_int(m);
- switch(event) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ event = (ssh_audit_event_t)n;
+ switch (event) {
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
@@ -1816,7 +1660,7 @@ mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m)
case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
case SSH_INVALID_USER:
- audit_event(event);
+ audit_event(ssh, event);
break;
default:
fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event);
@@ -1826,13 +1670,14 @@ mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m)
}
int
-mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
{
- u_int len;
char *cmd;
+ int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
- cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cmd, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* sanity check command, if so how? */
audit_run_command(cmd);
free(cmd);
@@ -1841,9 +1686,17 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
void
-monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+monitor_clear_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+ ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN);
+ ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
+ sshbuf_free(child_state);
+ child_state = NULL;
+}
+
+void
+monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
struct kex *kex;
int r;
@@ -1853,36 +1706,33 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
sshbuf_free(child_state);
child_state = NULL;
- if ((kex = ssh->kex) != 0) {
+ if ((kex = ssh->kex) != NULL) {
/* XXX set callbacks */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
# endif
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
}
-
- /* Update with new address */
- if (options.compression) {
- ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, pmonitor->m_zlib,
- (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
- (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
- }
}
-/* This function requries careful sanity checking */
+/* This function requires careful sanity checking */
void
-mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
@@ -1905,9 +1755,18 @@ static void
monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
{
int pair[2];
+#ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
+ int on = 1;
+#endif
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+#ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
+ if (setsockopt(pair[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
+ error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(0): %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ if (setsockopt(pair[1], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
+ error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(1): %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#endif
FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
@@ -1929,24 +1788,11 @@ monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
struct monitor *
monitor_init(void)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
struct monitor *mon;
mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
-
monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
- /* Used to share zlib space across processes */
- if (options.compression) {
- mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
- mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
-
- /* Compression needs to share state across borders */
- ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, mon->m_zlib,
- (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
- (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
- }
-
return mon;
}
@@ -1958,21 +1804,29 @@ monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
#ifdef GSSAPI
int
-mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
gss_OID_desc goid;
OM_uint32 major;
- u_int len;
+ size_t len;
+ u_char *p;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!options.gss_authentication)
+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
- goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goid.elements = p;
goid.length = len;
major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
free(goid.elements);
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, major);
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
@@ -1983,23 +1837,27 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
}
int
-mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
gss_buffer_desc in;
gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 major, minor;
OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
- u_int len;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!options.gss_authentication)
+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
- in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- in.length = len;
+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
free(in.value);
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, major);
- buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
- buffer_put_int(m, flags);
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, out.value, out.length)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, flags)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
@@ -2013,24 +1871,27 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
}
int
-mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
OM_uint32 ret;
- u_int len;
+ int r;
- gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- gssbuf.length = len;
- mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- mic.length = len;
+ if (!options.gss_authentication)
+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+
+ if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
free(gssbuf.value);
free(mic.value);
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, ret);
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
@@ -2041,20 +1902,28 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
}
int
-mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
+mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
- int authenticated;
+ int r, authenticated;
+ const char *displayname;
+
+ if (!options.gss_authentication)
+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+ sshbuf_reset(m);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
+ if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
+ auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
+
/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
return (authenticated);
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-10-03 02:19:17 +0000