diff options
author | Alistair Delva <adelva@google.com> | 2020-08-20 16:14:23 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Alistair Delva <adelva@google.com> | 2020-08-20 16:53:18 -0700 |
commit | d9da10d147d633fdb6ec65e17ff4b8447419d83e (patch) | |
tree | 8f93e8fdc2907f141e0924910bfec26669819f0b /sshconnect2.c | |
parent | 22246b08952d746a7cc5a292570636cf4277598f (diff) | |
parent | ecb2c02d994b3e21994f31a70ff911667c262f1f (diff) |
Merge upstream-master into master
Commit ecb2c02d994b3e21994f31a70ff911667c262f1f upstream
This nearly (but not quite) corresponds to V_8_3_P1; subsequent
cherry-picks will correct this.
Bug: 162492243
Change-Id: I3c079d86435b7c25aefff4538dc89a3002b1e25b
Diffstat (limited to 'sshconnect2.c')
-rw-r--r-- | sshconnect2.c | 1737 |
1 files changed, 1087 insertions, 650 deletions
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c index ba56f643..1a6545ed 100644 --- a/sshconnect2.c +++ b/sshconnect2.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.223 2015/01/30 11:43:14 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.321 2020/04/17 03:38:47 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. @@ -36,9 +36,9 @@ #include <netdb.h> #include <pwd.h> #include <signal.h> -#include <stdarg.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> +#include <stdarg.h> #include <unistd.h> #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) #include <vis.h> @@ -49,11 +49,11 @@ #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" -#include "buffer.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" #include "packet.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" -#include "key.h" +#include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "sshconnect.h" @@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ #include "uidswap.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "ssherr.h" +#include "utf8.h" +#include "ssh-sk.h" +#include "sk-api.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" @@ -92,7 +95,7 @@ char *xxx_host; struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr; static int -verify_host_key_callback(Key *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) +verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) { if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey) == -1) fatal("Host key verification failed."); @@ -116,7 +119,7 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]); - oavail = avail = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG); + oavail = avail = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms); maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1; first = xmalloc(maxlen); last = xmalloc(maxlen); @@ -154,90 +157,96 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) } void -ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) +ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) { char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; - struct kex *kex; - int r; + char *s, *all_key; + int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0; xxx_host = host; xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; - if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) { - logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults."); - options.ciphers = NULL; - } - if (options.ciphers != NULL) { - myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = - myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; - } + /* + * If the user has not specified HostkeyAlgorithms, or has only + * appended or removed algorithms from that list then prefer algorithms + * that are in the list that are supported by known_hosts keys. + */ + if (options.hostkeyalgorithms == NULL || + options.hostkeyalgorithms[0] == '-' || + options.hostkeyalgorithms[0] == '+') + use_known_hosts_order = 1; + + /* Expand or fill in HostkeyAlgorithms */ + all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ','); + if (kex_assemble_names(&options.hostkeyalgorithms, + kex_default_pk_alg(), all_key) != 0) + fatal("%s: kex_assemble_namelist", __func__); + free(all_key); + + if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL) + fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s); myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = - compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); + compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers); myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = - compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]); - if (options.compression) { - myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = - myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "zlib@openssh.com,zlib,none"; - } else { - myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = - myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib"; - } - if (options.macs != NULL) { - myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = - myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; - } - if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) - myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = - compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms); - else { - /* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */ + compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = + (char *)compression_alg_list(options.compression); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; + if (use_known_hosts_order) { + /* Query known_hosts and prefer algorithms that appear there */ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal( order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port)); + } else { + /* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms exactly */ + myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = + compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms); } - if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL) - myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms; - myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal( - myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) - packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit, - (time_t)options.rekey_interval); + ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit, + options.rekey_interval); /* start key exchange */ - if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0) + if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0) fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r)); - kex = active_state->kex; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client; - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client; - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client; # endif #endif - kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client; - kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; - kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; - kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client; + ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client; + ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; - dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state); + ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &ssh->kex->done); - if (options.use_roaming && !kex->roaming) { - debug("Roaming not allowed by server"); - options.use_roaming = 0; - } + /* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */ + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = + compat_kex_proposal(options.kex_algorithms); + if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal)) != 0) + fatal("kex_prop2buf: %s", ssh_err(r)); - session_id2 = kex->session_id; - session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len; + session_id2 = ssh->kex->session_id; + session_id2_len = ssh->kex->session_id_len; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE); - packet_put_cstring("markus"); - packet_send(); - packet_write_wait(); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "markus")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || + (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); #endif } @@ -269,7 +278,11 @@ struct cauthctxt { struct cauthmethod *method; sig_atomic_t success; char *authlist; - int attempt; +#ifdef GSSAPI + /* gssapi */ + gss_OID_set gss_supported_mechs; + u_int mech_tried; +#endif /* pubkey */ struct idlist keys; int agent_fd; @@ -279,48 +292,53 @@ struct cauthctxt { const char *active_ktype; /* kbd-interactive */ int info_req_seen; + int attempt_kbdint; + /* password */ + int attempt_passwd; /* generic */ void *methoddata; }; struct cauthmethod { char *name; /* string to compare against server's list */ - int (*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt); - void (*cleanup)(Authctxt *authctxt); + int (*userauth)(struct ssh *ssh); + void (*cleanup)(struct ssh *ssh); int *enabled; /* flag in option struct that enables method */ int *batch_flag; /* flag in option struct that disables method */ }; -int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_userauth_success_unexpected(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_userauth_error(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, void *); - -int userauth_none(Authctxt *); -int userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *); -int userauth_passwd(Authctxt *); -int userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *); -int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *); +static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +static int input_userauth_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +static int input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +static int input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +static int input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + +static int userauth_none(struct ssh *); +static int userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *); +static int userauth_passwd(struct ssh *); +static int userauth_kbdint(struct ssh *); +static int userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *); #ifdef GSSAPI -int userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt); -int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *); -int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); +static int userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *); +static void userauth_gssapi_cleanup(struct ssh *); +static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +static int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); #endif -void userauth(Authctxt *, char *); +void userauth(struct ssh *, char *); -static int sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *, Identity *); +static void pubkey_cleanup(struct ssh *); +static int sign_and_send_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *); static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *); -static void pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *); -static Key *load_identity_file(char *, int); +static void pubkey_reset(Authctxt *); +static struct sshkey *load_identity_file(Identity *); static Authmethod *authmethod_get(char *authlist); static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *name); @@ -330,7 +348,7 @@ Authmethod authmethods[] = { #ifdef GSSAPI {"gssapi-with-mic", userauth_gssapi, - NULL, + userauth_gssapi_cleanup, &options.gss_authentication, NULL}, #endif @@ -363,39 +381,19 @@ Authmethod authmethods[] = { }; void -ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host, - Sensitive *sensitive) +ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user, + const char *server_user, char *host, Sensitive *sensitive) { Authctxt authctxt; - int type; + int r; if (options.challenge_response_authentication) options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; - - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST); - packet_put_cstring("ssh-userauth"); - packet_send(); - debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST sent"); - packet_write_wait(); - type = packet_read(); - if (type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) - fatal("Server denied authentication request: %d", type); - if (packet_remaining() > 0) { - char *reply = packet_get_string(NULL); - debug2("service_accept: %s", reply); - free(reply); - } else { - debug2("buggy server: service_accept w/o service"); - } - packet_check_eom(); - debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT received"); - if (options.preferred_authentications == NULL) options.preferred_authentications = authmethods_get(); /* setup authentication context */ memset(&authctxt, 0, sizeof(authctxt)); - pubkey_prepare(&authctxt); authctxt.server_user = server_user; authctxt.local_user = local_user; authctxt.host = host; @@ -407,30 +405,85 @@ ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host, authctxt.sensitive = sensitive; authctxt.active_ktype = authctxt.oktypes = authctxt.ktypes = NULL; authctxt.info_req_seen = 0; + authctxt.attempt_kbdint = 0; + authctxt.attempt_passwd = 0; +#if GSSAPI + authctxt.gss_supported_mechs = NULL; + authctxt.mech_tried = 0; +#endif authctxt.agent_fd = -1; - if (authctxt.method == NULL) - fatal("ssh_userauth2: internal error: cannot send userauth none request"); + pubkey_prepare(&authctxt); + if (authctxt.method == NULL) { + fatal("%s: internal error: cannot send userauth none request", + __func__); + } - /* initial userauth request */ - userauth_none(&authctxt); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "ssh-userauth")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - dispatch_init(&input_userauth_error); - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, &input_userauth_success); - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, &input_userauth_failure); - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER, &input_userauth_banner); - dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success, &authctxt); /* loop until success */ + ssh->authctxt = &authctxt; + ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept); + ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success); /* loop until success */ + pubkey_cleanup(ssh); + ssh->authctxt = NULL; - pubkey_cleanup(&authctxt); - dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX, NULL); + if (!authctxt.success) + fatal("Authentication failed."); debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name); } +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int +input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + int r; + + if (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) { + char *reply; + + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &reply, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + debug2("service_accept: %s", reply); + free(reply); + } else { + debug2("buggy server: service_accept w/o service"); + } + if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT received"); + + /* initial userauth request */ + userauth_none(ssh); + + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_error); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, &input_userauth_success); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, &input_userauth_failure); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER, &input_userauth_banner); + r = 0; + out: + return r; +} + +/* ARGSUSED */ +static int +input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh) +{ + return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh); +} + void -userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist) +userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist) { + Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; + if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL) - authctxt->method->cleanup(authctxt); + authctxt->method->cleanup(ssh); free(authctxt->methoddata); authctxt->methoddata = NULL; @@ -443,15 +496,16 @@ userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist) for (;;) { Authmethod *method = authmethod_get(authlist); if (method == NULL) - fatal("Permission denied (%s).", authlist); + fatal("%s@%s: Permission denied (%s).", + authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host, authlist); authctxt->method = method; /* reset the per method handler */ - dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN, + ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX, NULL); /* and try new method */ - if (method->userauth(authctxt) != 0) { + if (method->userauth(ssh) != 0) { debug2("we sent a %s packet, wait for reply", method->name); break; } else { @@ -462,59 +516,56 @@ userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist) } /* ARGSUSED */ -int -input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +static int +input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - fatal("input_userauth_error: bad message during authentication: " - "type %d", type); + fatal("%s: bad message during authentication: type %d", __func__, type); return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ -int -input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +static int +input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - char *msg, *raw, *lang; - u_int len; - - debug3("input_userauth_banner"); - raw = packet_get_string(&len); - lang = packet_get_string(NULL); - if (len > 0 && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) { - if (len > 65536) - len = 65536; - msg = xmalloc(len * 4 + 1); /* max expansion from strnvis() */ - strnvis(msg, raw, len * 4 + 1, VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL|VIS_NOSLASH); - fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg); - free(msg); - } - free(raw); - free(lang); - return 0; + char *msg = NULL; + size_t len; + int r; + + debug3("%s", __func__); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, &len)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + if (len > 0 && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) + fmprintf(stderr, "%s", msg); + r = 0; + out: + free(msg); + return r; } /* ARGSUSED */ -int -input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +static int +input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; if (authctxt == NULL) - fatal("input_userauth_success: no authentication context"); + fatal("%s: no authentication context", __func__); free(authctxt->authlist); authctxt->authlist = NULL; if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL) - authctxt->method->cleanup(authctxt); + authctxt->method->cleanup(ssh); free(authctxt->methoddata); authctxt->methoddata = NULL; authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */ return 0; } -int -input_userauth_success_unexpected(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +#if 0 +static int +input_userauth_success_unexpected(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: no authentication context", __func__); @@ -523,71 +574,95 @@ input_userauth_success_unexpected(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) authctxt->method->name); return 0; } +#endif /* ARGSUSED */ -int -input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +static int +input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; char *authlist = NULL; - int partial; + u_char partial; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_failure: no authentication context"); - authlist = packet_get_string(NULL); - partial = packet_get_char(); - packet_check_eom(); + if (sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &authlist, NULL) != 0 || + sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &partial) != 0 || + sshpkt_get_end(ssh) != 0) + goto out; if (partial != 0) { - logit("Authenticated with partial success."); + verbose("Authenticated with partial success."); /* reset state */ - pubkey_cleanup(authctxt); - pubkey_prepare(authctxt); + pubkey_reset(authctxt); } debug("Authentications that can continue: %s", authlist); - userauth(authctxt, authlist); + userauth(ssh, authlist); + authlist = NULL; + out: + free(authlist); return 0; } +/* + * Format an identity for logging including filename, key type, fingerprint + * and location (agent, etc.). Caller must free. + */ +static char * +format_identity(Identity *id) +{ + char *fp = NULL, *ret = NULL; + const char *note = ""; + + if (id->key != NULL) { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + } + if (id->key) { + if ((id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) + note = " token"; + else if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key)) + note = " authenticator"; + } + xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s%s%s%s%s%s", + id->filename, + id->key ? sshkey_type(id->key) : "", id->key ? " " : "", + fp ? fp : "", + id->userprovided ? " explicit" : "", note, + id->agent_fd != -1 ? " agent" : ""); + free(fp); + return ret; +} + /* ARGSUSED */ -int -input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +static int +input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; - Key *key = NULL; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + struct sshkey *key = NULL; Identity *id = NULL; - Buffer b; - int pktype, sent = 0; - u_int alen, blen; - char *pkalg, *fp; - u_char *pkblob; + int pktype, found = 0, sent = 0; + size_t blen; + char *pkalg = NULL, *fp = NULL, *ident = NULL; + u_char *pkblob = NULL; + int r; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_pk_ok: no authentication context"); - if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKOK) { - /* this is similar to SSH_BUG_PKAUTH */ - debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: SSH_BUG_PKOK"); - pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); - buffer_init(&b); - buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen); - pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen); - buffer_free(&b); - } else { - pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen); - pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); - } - packet_check_eom(); - debug("Server accepts key: pkalg %s blen %u", pkalg, blen); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + goto done; - if ((pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) { - debug("unknown pkalg %s", pkalg); + if ((pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) { + debug("%s: server sent unknown pkalg %s", __func__, pkalg); goto done; } - if ((key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen)) == NULL) { - debug("no key from blob. pkalg %s", pkalg); + if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) { + debug("no key from blob. pkalg %s: %s", pkalg, ssh_err(r)); goto done; } if (key->type != pktype) { @@ -596,11 +671,6 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) key->type, pktype); goto done; } - if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, - SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) - goto done; - debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp); - free(fp); /* * search keys in the reverse order, because last candidate has been @@ -608,128 +678,164 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) * duplicate keys */ TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(id, &authctxt->keys, idlist, next) { - if (key_equal(key, id->key)) { - sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, id); + if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key)) { + found = 1; break; } } -done: - if (key != NULL) - key_free(key); + if (!found || id == NULL) { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + error("%s: server replied with unknown key: %s %s", __func__, + sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "<ERROR>" : fp); + goto done; + } + ident = format_identity(id); + debug("Server accepts key: %s", ident); + sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(ssh, id); + r = 0; + done: + sshkey_free(key); + free(ident); + free(fp); free(pkalg); free(pkblob); /* try another method if we did not send a packet */ - if (sent == 0) - userauth(authctxt, NULL); - return 0; + if (r == 0 && sent == 0) + userauth(ssh, NULL); + return r; } #ifdef GSSAPI -int -userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) +static int +userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh) { + Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt = NULL; - static gss_OID_set gss_supported = NULL; - static u_int mech = 0; OM_uint32 min; - int ok = 0; + int r, ok = 0; + gss_OID mech = NULL; /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at * once. */ - if (gss_supported == NULL) - gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported); + if (authctxt->gss_supported_mechs == NULL) + gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs); - /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ - while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) { + /* Check to see whether the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ + while (authctxt->mech_tried < authctxt->gss_supported_mechs->count && + !ok) { + mech = &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs-> + elements[authctxt->mech_tried]; /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ - if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 && - ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, - &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) { + if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, + mech, authctxt->host)) { ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ } else { - mech++; + authctxt->mech_tried++; } } - if (!ok) + if (!ok || mech == NULL) return 0; authctxt->methoddata=(void *)gssctxt; - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); - packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); - packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); - packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (mech->length) + 2)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, mech->length)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put(ssh, mech->elements, mech->length)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - packet_put_int(1); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE, &input_gssapi_response); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR, &input_gssapi_error); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok); - packet_put_int((gss_supported->elements[mech].length) + 2); - packet_put_char(SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE); - packet_put_char(gss_supported->elements[mech].length); - packet_put_raw(gss_supported->elements[mech].elements, - gss_supported->elements[mech].length); + authctxt->mech_tried++; /* Move along to next candidate */ - packet_send(); + return 1; +} - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE, &input_gssapi_response); - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token); - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR, &input_gssapi_error); - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok); +static void +userauth_gssapi_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; + Gssctxt *gssctxt = (Gssctxt *)authctxt->methoddata; - mech++; /* Move along to next candidate */ + ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&gssctxt); + authctxt->methoddata = NULL; - return 1; + free(authctxt->gss_supported_mechs); + authctxt->gss_supported_mechs = NULL; } static OM_uint32 -process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buffer_t recv_tok) +process_gssapi_token(struct ssh *ssh, gss_buffer_t recv_tok) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; OM_uint32 status, ms, flags; - Buffer b; + int r; status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds, recv_tok, &send_tok, &flags); if (send_tok.length > 0) { - if (GSS_ERROR(status)) - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK); - else - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN); + u_char type = GSS_ERROR(status) ? + SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK : + SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN; + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, + send_tok.length)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); - packet_send(); gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok); } if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { /* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */ if (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) { - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE); - packet_send(); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, + SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else { - ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, + struct sshbuf *b; + + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic"); - gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); - gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); + if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__); + gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b); status = ssh_gssapi_sign(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic); if (!GSS_ERROR(status)) { - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC); - packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length); - - packet_send(); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, + SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, mic.value, + mic.length)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } - buffer_free(&b); + sshbuf_free(b); gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic); } } @@ -738,100 +844,112 @@ process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buffer_t recv_tok) } /* ARGSUSED */ -int -input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) +static int +input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; - int oidlen; - char *oidv; + size_t oidlen; + u_char *oidv = NULL; + int r; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; /* Setup our OID */ - oidv = packet_get_string(&oidlen); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &oidv, &oidlen)) != 0) + goto done; if (oidlen <= 2 || oidv[0] != SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE || oidv[1] != oidlen - 2) { - free(oidv); debug("Badly encoded mechanism OID received"); - userauth(authctxt, NULL); - return 0; + userauth(ssh, NULL); + goto ok; } if (!ssh_gssapi_check_oid(gssctxt, oidv + 2, oidlen - 2)) fatal("Server returned different OID than expected"); - packet_check_eom(); - - free(oidv); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + goto done; - if (GSS_ERROR(process_gssapi_token(ctxt, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER))) { + if (GSS_ERROR(process_gssapi_token(ssh, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER))) { /* Start again with next method on list */ debug("Trying to start again"); - userauth(authctxt, NULL); - return 0; + userauth(ssh, NULL); + goto ok; } - return 0; + ok: + r = 0; + done: + free(oidv); + return r; } /* ARGSUSED */ -int -input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) +static int +input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; + u_char *p = NULL; + size_t len; OM_uint32 status; - u_int slen; + int r; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); - recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); - recv_tok.length = slen; /* safe typecast */ - - packet_check_eom(); - - status = process_gssapi_token(ctxt, &recv_tok); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; - free(recv_tok.value); + recv_tok.value = p; + recv_tok.length = len; + status = process_gssapi_token(ssh, &recv_tok); + /* Start again with the next method in the list */ if (GSS_ERROR(status)) { - /* Start again with the next method in the list */ - userauth(authctxt, NULL); - return 0; + userauth(ssh, NULL); + /* ok */ } - return 0; + r = 0; + out: + free(p); + return r; } /* ARGSUSED */ -int -input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) +static int +input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; OM_uint32 ms; - u_int len; + u_char *p = NULL; + size_t len; + int r; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; - recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&len); - recv_tok.length = len; - - packet_check_eom(); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) { + free(p); + return r; + } /* Stick it into GSSAPI and see what it says */ + recv_tok.value = p; + recv_tok.length = len; (void)ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds, &recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL); - - free(recv_tok.value); + free(p); gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok); /* Server will be returning a failed packet after this one */ @@ -839,68 +957,75 @@ input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) } /* ARGSUSED */ -int -input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) +static int +input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh) { - char *msg; - char *lang; - - /* maj */(void)packet_get_int(); - /* min */(void)packet_get_int(); - msg=packet_get_string(NULL); - lang=packet_get_string(NULL); - - packet_check_eom(); + char *msg = NULL; + char *lang = NULL; + int r; + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* maj */ + (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* min */ + (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh); debug("Server GSSAPI Error:\n%s", msg); + out: free(msg); free(lang); - return 0; + return r; } #endif /* GSSAPI */ -int -userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt) +static int +userauth_none(struct ssh *ssh) { + Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; + int r; + /* initial userauth request */ - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); - packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); - packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); - packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); - packet_send(); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return 1; } -int -userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt) +static int +userauth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh) { - static int attempt = 0; - char prompt[150]; - char *password; + Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; + char *password, *prompt = NULL; const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host; + int r; - if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts) + if (authctxt->attempt_passwd++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts) return 0; - if (attempt != 1) + if (authctxt->attempt_passwd != 1) error("Permission denied, please try again."); - snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password: ", - authctxt->server_user, host); + xasprintf(&prompt, "%s@%s's password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); - packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); - packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); - packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); - packet_put_char(0); - packet_put_cstring(password); - explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password)); - free(password); - packet_add_padding(64); - packet_send(); - - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + free(prompt); + if (password != NULL) + freezero(password, strlen(password)); + + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, &input_userauth_passwd_changereq); return 1; @@ -910,39 +1035,42 @@ userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt) * parse PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, prompt user and send SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST */ /* ARGSUSED */ -int -input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt) +static int +input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; - char *info, *lang, *password = NULL, *retype = NULL; - char prompt[150]; - const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : - authctxt->host; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + char *info = NULL, *lang = NULL, *password = NULL, *retype = NULL; + char prompt[256]; + const char *host; + int r; debug2("input_userauth_passwd_changereq"); if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_passwd_changereq: " "no authentication context"); + host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host; - info = packet_get_string(NULL); - lang = packet_get_string(NULL); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &info, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; if (strlen(info) > 0) logit("%s", info); - free(info); - free(lang); - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); - packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); - packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); - packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); - packet_put_char(1); /* additional info */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* additional info */ + goto out; + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter %.30s@%.128s's old password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); - packet_put_cstring(password); - explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password)); - free(password); + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0) + goto out; + + freezero(password, strlen(password)); password = NULL; while (password == NULL) { snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), @@ -951,194 +1079,387 @@ input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt) password = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF); if (password == NULL) { /* bail out */ - return 0; + r = 0; + goto out; } snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Retype %.30s@%.128s's new password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); retype = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); if (strcmp(password, retype) != 0) { - explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password)); - free(password); + freezero(password, strlen(password)); logit("Mismatch; try again, EOF to quit."); password = NULL; } - explicit_bzero(retype, strlen(retype)); - free(retype); + freezero(retype, strlen(retype)); } - packet_put_cstring(password); - explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password)); - free(password); - packet_add_padding(64); - packet_send(); + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, &input_userauth_passwd_changereq); - return 0; + r = 0; + out: + if (password) + freezero(password, strlen(password)); + free(info); + free(lang); + return r; +} + +/* + * Select an algorithm for publickey signatures. + * Returns algorithm (caller must free) or NULL if no mutual algorithm found. + * + * Call with ssh==NULL to ignore server-sig-algs extension list and + * only attempt with the key's base signature type. + */ +static char * +key_sig_algorithm(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key) +{ + char *allowed, *oallowed, *cp, *tmp, *alg = NULL; + + /* + * The signature algorithm will only differ from the key algorithm + * for RSA keys/certs and when the server advertises support for + * newer (SHA2) algorithms. + */ + if (ssh == NULL || ssh->kex->server_sig_algs == NULL || + (key->type != KEY_RSA && key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT) || + (key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE))) { + /* Filter base key signature alg against our configuration */ + return match_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), + options.pubkey_key_types, NULL); + } + + /* + * For RSA keys/certs, since these might have a different sig type: + * find the first entry in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes of the right type + * that also appears in the supported signature algorithms list from + * the server. + */ + oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_key_types); + while ((cp = strsep(&allowed, ",")) != NULL) { + if (sshkey_type_from_name(cp) != key->type) + continue; + tmp = match_list(sshkey_sigalg_by_name(cp), ssh->kex->server_sig_algs, NULL); + if (tmp != NULL) + alg = xstrdup(cp); + free(tmp); + if (alg != NULL) + break; + } + free(oallowed); + return alg; } static int identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, - const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat, const char *alg) { - Key *prv; - int ret; + struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL, *prv = NULL; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL; + char *fp = NULL; + + *sigp = NULL; + *lenp = 0; - /* the agent supports this key */ - if (id->agent_fd) + /* The agent supports this key. */ + if (id->key != NULL && id->agent_fd != -1) { return ssh_agent_sign(id->agent_fd, id->key, sigp, lenp, - data, datalen, compat); + data, datalen, alg, compat); + } /* - * we have already loaded the private key or - * the private key is stored in external hardware + * We have already loaded the private key or the private key is + * stored in external hardware. */ - if (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT)) - return (sshkey_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, - compat)); - /* load the private key from the file */ - if ((prv = load_identity_file(id->filename, id->userprovided)) == NULL) - return (-1); /* XXX return decent error code */ - ret = sshkey_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); + if (id->key != NULL && + (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT))) { + sign_key = id->key; + } else { + /* Load the private key from the file. */ + if ((prv = load_identity_file(id)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; + if (id->key != NULL && !sshkey_equal_public(prv, id->key)) { + error("%s: private key %s contents do not match public", + __func__, id->filename); + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; + goto out; + } + sign_key = prv; + if (sshkey_is_sk(sign_key) && + (sign_key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) { + /* XXX match batch mode should just skip these keys? */ + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key, + options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint", __func__); + notifier = notify_start(options.batch_mode, + "Confirm user presence for key %s %s", + sshkey_type(sign_key), fp); + free(fp); + } + } + if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, + alg, options.sk_provider, compat)) != 0) { + debug("%s: sshkey_sign: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + /* + * PKCS#11 tokens may not support all signature algorithms, + * so check what we get back. + */ + if ((r = sshkey_check_sigtype(*sigp, *lenp, alg)) != 0) { + debug("%s: sshkey_check_sigtype: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + goto out; + } + /* success */ + r = 0; + out: + notify_complete(notifier); sshkey_free(prv); - return (ret); + return r; +} + +static int +id_filename_matches(Identity *id, Identity *private_id) +{ + const char *suffixes[] = { ".pub", "-cert.pub", NULL }; + size_t len = strlen(id->filename), plen = strlen(private_id->filename); + size_t i, slen; + + if (strcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename) == 0) + return 1; + for (i = 0; suffixes[i]; i++) { + slen = strlen(suffixes[i]); + if (len > slen && plen == len - slen && + strcmp(id->filename + (len - slen), suffixes[i]) == 0 && + memcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename, plen) == 0) + return 1; + } + return 0; } static int -sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id) +sign_and_send_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *id) { - Buffer b; - u_char *blob, *signature; - u_int bloblen; - size_t slen; - u_int skip = 0; - int ret = -1; - int have_sig = 1; - char *fp; + Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + Identity *private_id, *sign_id = NULL; + u_char *signature = NULL; + size_t slen = 0, skip = 0; + int r, fallback_sigtype, sent = 0; + char *alg = NULL, *fp = NULL; + const char *loc = ""; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) return 0; - debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp); - free(fp); - if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) { - /* we cannot handle this key */ - debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: cannot handle key"); - return 0; - } - /* data to be signed */ - buffer_init(&b); - if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { - buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); - skip = session_id2_len; - } else { - buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); - skip = buffer_len(&b); - } - buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, - datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ? - "ssh-userauth" : - authctxt->service); - if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { - buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); - } else { - buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name); - buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(id->key)); - } - buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen); - - /* generate signature */ - ret = identity_sign(id, &signature, &slen, - buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), datafellows); - if (ret != 0) { - free(blob); - buffer_free(&b); - return 0; + debug3("%s: %s %s", __func__, sshkey_type(id->key), fp); + + /* + * If the key is an certificate, try to find a matching private key + * and use it to complete the signature. + * If no such private key exists, fall back to trying the certificate + * key itself in case it has a private half already loaded. + * This will try to set sign_id to the private key that will perform + * the signature. + */ + if (sshkey_is_cert(id->key)) { + TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) { + if (sshkey_equal_public(id->key, private_id->key) && + id->key->type != private_id->key->type) { + sign_id = private_id; + break; + } + } + /* + * Exact key matches are preferred, but also allow + * filename matches for non-PKCS#11/agent keys that + * didn't load public keys. This supports the case + * of keeping just a private key file and public + * certificate on disk. + */ + if (sign_id == NULL && + !id->isprivate && id->agent_fd == -1 && + (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) { + TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) { + if (private_id->key == NULL && + id_filename_matches(id, private_id)) { + sign_id = private_id; + break; + } + } + } + if (sign_id != NULL) { + debug2("%s: using private key \"%s\"%s for " + "certificate", __func__, id->filename, + id->agent_fd != -1 ? " from agent" : ""); + } else { + debug("%s: no separate private key for certificate " + "\"%s\"", __func__, id->filename); + } } -#ifdef DEBUG_PK - buffer_dump(&b); -#endif - if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE) { - buffer_clear(&b); - buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); - skip = session_id2_len; - buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->service); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name); - buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); - if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH)) - buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(id->key)); - buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen); + + /* + * If the above didn't select another identity to do the signing + * then default to the one we started with. + */ + if (sign_id == NULL) + sign_id = id; + + /* assemble and sign data */ + for (fallback_sigtype = 0; fallback_sigtype <= 1; fallback_sigtype++) { + free(alg); + slen = 0; + signature = NULL; + if ((alg = key_sig_algorithm(fallback_sigtype ? NULL : ssh, + id->key)) == NULL) { + error("%s: no mutual signature supported", __func__); + goto out; + } + debug3("%s: signing using %s %s", __func__, alg, fp); + + sshbuf_free(b); + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, session_id2, + session_id2_len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + } else { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, + session_id2_len)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_string: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + } + skip = sshbuf_len(b); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, alg)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_puts(id->key, b)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: assemble signed data: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + + /* generate signature */ + r = identity_sign(sign_id, &signature, &slen, + sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), datafellows, alg); + if (r == 0) + break; + else if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND) + goto out; /* soft failure */ + else if (r == SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED && + !fallback_sigtype) { + if (sign_id->agent_fd != -1) + loc = "agent "; + else if ((sign_id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) + loc = "token "; + logit("%skey %s %s returned incorrect signature type", + loc, sshkey_type(id->key), fp); + continue; + } + error("%s: signing failed for %s \"%s\"%s: %s", __func__, + sshkey_type(sign_id->key), sign_id->filename, + id->agent_fd != -1 ? " from agent" : "", ssh_err(r)); + goto out; } - free(blob); + if (slen == 0 || signature == NULL) /* shouldn't happen */ + fatal("%s: no signature", __func__); /* append signature */ - buffer_put_string(&b, signature, slen); - free(signature); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, signature, slen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: append signature: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); +#endif /* skip session id and packet type */ - if (buffer_len(&b) < skip + 1) - fatal("userauth_pubkey: internal error"); - buffer_consume(&b, skip + 1); + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, skip + 1)) != 0) + fatal("%s: consume: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* put remaining data from buffer into packet */ - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); - packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)); - buffer_free(&b); - packet_send(); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, b)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: enqueue request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - return 1; + /* success */ + sent = 1; + + out: + free(fp); + free(alg); + sshbuf_free(b); + freezero(signature, slen); + return sent; } static int -send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id) +send_pubkey_test(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *id) { - u_char *blob; - u_int bloblen, have_sig = 0; - - debug3("send_pubkey_test"); + Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; + u_char *blob = NULL; + char *alg = NULL; + size_t bloblen; + u_int have_sig = 0; + int sent = 0, r; + + if ((alg = key_sig_algorithm(ssh, id->key)) == NULL) { + debug("%s: no mutual signature algorithm", __func__); + goto out; + } - if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) { + if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0) { /* we cannot handle this key */ - debug3("send_pubkey_test: cannot handle key"); - return 0; + debug3("%s: cannot handle key", __func__); + goto out; } /* register callback for USERAUTH_PK_OK message */ - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, &input_userauth_pk_ok); - - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); - packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); - packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); - packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); - packet_put_char(have_sig); - if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH)) - packet_put_cstring(key_ssh_name(id->key)); - packet_put_string(blob, bloblen); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, &input_userauth_pk_ok); + + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, have_sig)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, alg)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, blob, bloblen)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + sent = 1; + + out: + free(alg); free(blob); - packet_send(); - return 1; + return sent; } -static Key * -load_identity_file(char *filename, int userprovided) +static struct sshkey * +load_identity_file(Identity *id) { - Key *private; - char prompt[300], *passphrase; - int r, perm_ok = 0, quit = 0, i; + struct sshkey *private = NULL; + char prompt[300], *passphrase, *comment; + int r, quit = 0, i; struct stat st; - if (stat(filename, &st) < 0) { - (userprovided ? logit : debug3)("no such identity: %s: %s", - filename, strerror(errno)); + if (stat(id->filename, &st) == -1) { + (id->userprovided ? logit : debug3)("no such identity: %s: %s", + id->filename, strerror(errno)); return NULL; } snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt, - "Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", filename); + "Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", id->filename); for (i = 0; i <= options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { if (i == 0) passphrase = ""; @@ -1150,8 +1471,8 @@ load_identity_file(char *filename, int userprovided) break; } } - switch ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, - passphrase, &private, NULL, &perm_ok))) { + switch ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, id->filename, + passphrase, &private, &comment))) { case 0: break; case SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE: @@ -1165,31 +1486,74 @@ load_identity_file(char *filename, int userprovided) case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: if (errno == ENOENT) { debug2("Load key \"%s\": %s", - filename, ssh_err(r)); + id->filename, ssh_err(r)); quit = 1; break; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: - error("Load key \"%s\": %s", filename, ssh_err(r)); + error("Load key \"%s\": %s", id->filename, ssh_err(r)); quit = 1; break; } - if (i > 0) { - explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); - free(passphrase); + if (private != NULL && sshkey_is_sk(private) && + options.sk_provider == NULL) { + debug("key \"%s\" is an authenticator-hosted key, " + "but no provider specified", id->filename); + sshkey_free(private); + private = NULL; + quit = 1; } + if (!quit && private != NULL && id->agent_fd == -1 && + !(id->key && id->isprivate)) + maybe_add_key_to_agent(id->filename, private, comment, + passphrase); + if (i > 0) + freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); + free(comment); if (private != NULL || quit) break; } return private; } +static int +key_type_allowed_by_config(struct sshkey *key) +{ + if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), + options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1) + return 1; + + /* RSA keys/certs might be allowed by alternate signature types */ + switch (key->type) { + case KEY_RSA: + if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", + options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1) + return 1; + if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", + options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1) + return 1; + break; + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com", + options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1) + return 1; + if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com", + options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1) + return 1; + break; + } + return 0; +} + + /* * try keys in the following order: - * 1. agent keys that are found in the config file - * 2. other agent keys - * 3. keys that are only listed in the config file + * 1. certificates listed in the config file + * 2. other input certificates + * 3. agent keys that are found in the config file + * 4. other agent keys + * 5. keys that are only listed in the config file */ static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt) @@ -1197,9 +1561,10 @@ pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt) struct identity *id, *id2, *tmp; struct idlist agent, files, *preferred; struct sshkey *key; - int agent_fd, i, r, found; + int agent_fd = -1, i, r, found; size_t j; struct ssh_identitylist *idlist; + char *ident; TAILQ_INIT(&agent); /* keys from the agent */ TAILQ_INIT(&files); /* keys from the config file */ @@ -1209,49 +1574,61 @@ pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt) /* list of keys stored in the filesystem and PKCS#11 */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { key = options.identity_keys[i]; - if (key && key->type == KEY_RSA1) + if (key && key->cert && + key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) { + debug("%s: ignoring certificate %s: not a user " + "certificate", __func__, + options.identity_files[i]); continue; - if (key && key->cert && key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) + } + if (key && sshkey_is_sk(key) && options.sk_provider == NULL) { + debug("%s: ignoring authenticator-hosted key %s as no " + "SecurityKeyProvider has been specified", + __func__, options.identity_files[i]); continue; + } options.identity_keys[i] = NULL; id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); + id->agent_fd = -1; id->key = key; id->filename = xstrdup(options.identity_files[i]); id->userprovided = options.identity_file_userprovided[i]; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&files, id, next); } - /* Prefer PKCS11 keys that are explicitly listed */ - TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, &files, next, tmp) { - if (id->key == NULL || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) + /* list of certificates specified by user */ + for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) { + key = options.certificates[i]; + if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) || key->cert == NULL || + key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) { + debug("%s: ignoring certificate %s: not a user " + "certificate", __func__, + options.identity_files[i]); continue; - found = 0; - TAILQ_FOREACH(id2, &files, next) { - if (id2->key == NULL || - (id2->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) - continue; - if (sshkey_equal(id->key, id2->key)) { - TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); - TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); - found = 1; - break; - } } - /* If IdentitiesOnly set and key not found then don't use it */ - if (!found && options.identities_only) { - TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); - explicit_bzero(id, sizeof(*id)); - free(id); + if (key && sshkey_is_sk(key) && options.sk_provider == NULL) { + debug("%s: ignoring authenticator-hosted key " + "certificate %s as no " + "SecurityKeyProvider has been specified", + __func__, options.identity_files[i]); + continue; } + id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); + id->agent_fd = -1; + id->key = key; + id->filename = xstrdup(options.certificate_files[i]); + id->userprovided = options.certificate_file_userprovided[i]; + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); } /* list of keys supported by the agent */ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - } else if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, 2, &idlist)) != 0) { + } else if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES) debug("%s: ssh_fetch_identitylist: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + close(agent_fd); } else { for (j = 0; j < idlist->nkeys; j++) { found = 0; @@ -1287,39 +1664,104 @@ pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt) } authctxt->agent_fd = agent_fd; } + /* Prefer PKCS11 keys that are explicitly listed */ + TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, &files, next, tmp) { + if (id->key == NULL || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) + continue; + found = 0; + TAILQ_FOREACH(id2, &files, next) { + if (id2->key == NULL || + (id2->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) + continue; + if (sshkey_equal(id->key, id2->key)) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); + found = 1; + break; + } + } + /* If IdentitiesOnly set and key not found then don't use it */ + if (!found && options.identities_only) { + TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); + freezero(id, sizeof(*id)); + } + } /* append remaining keys from the config file */ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); } - TAILQ_FOREACH(id, preferred, next) { - debug2("key: %s (%p),%s", id->filename, id->key, - id->userprovided ? " explicit" : ""); + /* finally, filter by PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes */ + TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, preferred, next, id2) { + if (id->key != NULL && !key_type_allowed_by_config(id->key)) { + debug("Skipping %s key %s - " + "not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes", + sshkey_ssh_name(id->key), id->filename); + TAILQ_REMOVE(preferred, id, next); + sshkey_free(id->key); + free(id->filename); + memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id)); + continue; + } + } + /* List the keys we plan on using */ + TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, preferred, next, id2) { + ident = format_identity(id); + debug("Will attempt key: %s", ident); + free(ident); } + debug2("%s: done", __func__); } static void -pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) +pubkey_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh) { + Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; Identity *id; - if (authctxt->agent_fd != -1) + if (authctxt->agent_fd != -1) { ssh_close_authentication_socket(authctxt->agent_fd); + authctxt->agent_fd = -1; + } for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next); - if (id->key) - sshkey_free(id->key); + sshkey_free(id->key); free(id->filename); free(id); } } -int -userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) +static void +pubkey_reset(Authctxt *authctxt) { Identity *id; + + TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &authctxt->keys, next) + id->tried = 0; +} + +static int +try_identity(Identity *id) +{ + if (!id->key) + return (0); + if (sshkey_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA && + (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { + debug("Skipped %s key %s for RSA/MD5 server", + sshkey_type(id->key), id->filename); + return (0); + } + return 1; +} + +static int +userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh) +{ + Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; + Identity *id; int sent = 0; + char *ident; while ((id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys))) { if (id->tried++) @@ -1333,32 +1775,23 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) * private key instead */ if (id->key != NULL) { - if (key_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA && - (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { - debug("Skipped %s key %s for RSA/MD5 server", - key_type(id->key), id->filename); - } else if (id->key->type != KEY_RSA1) { - debug("Offering %s public key: %s", - key_type(id->key), id->filename); - sent = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, id); + if (try_identity(id)) { + ident = format_identity(id); + debug("Offering public key: %s", ident); + free(ident); + sent = send_pubkey_test(ssh, id); } } else { debug("Trying private key: %s", id->filename); - id->key = load_identity_file(id->filename, - id->userprovided); + id->key = load_identity_file(id); if (id->key != NULL) { - id->isprivate = 1; - if (key_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA && - (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { - debug("Skipped %s key %s for RSA/MD5 " - "server", key_type(id->key), - id->filename); - } else { - sent = sign_and_send_pubkey( - authctxt, id); + if (try_identity(id)) { + id->isprivate = 1; + sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(ssh, id); } - key_free(id->key); + sshkey_free(id->key); id->key = NULL; + id->isprivate = 0; } } if (sent) @@ -1370,44 +1803,48 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) /* * Send userauth request message specifying keyboard-interactive method. */ -int -userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt) +static int +userauth_kbdint(struct ssh *ssh) { - static int attempt = 0; + Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; + int r; - if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts) + if (authctxt->attempt_kbdint++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts) return 0; /* disable if no SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST has been seen */ - if (attempt > 1 && !authctxt->info_req_seen) { + if (authctxt->attempt_kbdint > 1 && !authctxt->info_req_seen) { debug3("userauth_kbdint: disable: no info_req_seen"); - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, NULL); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, NULL); return 0; } debug2("userauth_kbdint"); - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); - packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); - packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); - packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); - packet_put_cstring(""); /* lang */ - packet_put_cstring(options.kbd_interactive_devices ? - options.kbd_interactive_devices : ""); - packet_send(); - - dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, &input_userauth_info_req); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* lang */ + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, options.kbd_interactive_devices ? + options.kbd_interactive_devices : "")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, &input_userauth_info_req); return 1; } /* * parse INFO_REQUEST, prompt user and send INFO_RESPONSE */ -int -input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) +static int +input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { - Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; - char *name, *inst, *lang, *prompt, *response; + Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; + char *name = NULL, *inst = NULL, *lang = NULL, *prompt = NULL; + char *response = NULL; + u_char echo = 0; u_int num_prompts, i; - int echo = 0; + int r; debug2("input_userauth_info_req"); @@ -1416,61 +1853,70 @@ input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) authctxt->info_req_seen = 1; - name = packet_get_string(NULL); - inst = packet_get_string(NULL); - lang = packet_get_string(NULL); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &inst, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; if (strlen(name) > 0) logit("%s", name); if (strlen(inst) > 0) logit("%s", inst); - free(name); - free(inst); - free(lang); - num_prompts = packet_get_int(); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &num_prompts)) != 0) + goto out; /* * Begin to build info response packet based on prompts requested. * We commit to providing the correct number of responses, so if * further on we run into a problem that prevents this, we have to * be sure and clean this up and send a correct error response. */ - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE); - packet_put_int(num_prompts); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, num_prompts)) != 0) + goto out; debug2("input_userauth_info_req: num_prompts %d", num_prompts); for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++) { - prompt = packet_get_string(NULL); - echo = packet_get_char(); - + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &prompt, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &echo)) != 0) + goto out; response = read_passphrase(prompt, echo ? RP_ECHO : 0); - - packet_put_cstring(response); - explicit_bzero(response, strlen(response)); - free(response); + if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, response)) != 0) + goto out; + freezero(response, strlen(response)); free(prompt); + response = prompt = NULL; } - packet_check_eom(); /* done with parsing incoming message. */ - - packet_add_padding(64); - packet_send(); - return 0; + /* done with parsing incoming message. */ + if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0) + goto out; + r = sshpkt_send(ssh); + out: + if (response) + freezero(response, strlen(response)); + free(prompt); + free(name); + free(inst); + free(lang); + return r; } static int -ssh_keysign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, +ssh_keysign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen) { struct sshbuf *b; struct stat st; pid_t pid; - int i, r, to[2], from[2], status, sock = packet_get_connection_in(); + int r, to[2], from[2], status; + int sock = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh); u_char rversion = 0, version = 2; void (*osigchld)(int); *sigp = NULL; *lenp = 0; - if (stat(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, &st) < 0) { + if (stat(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, &st) == -1) { error("%s: not installed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } @@ -1478,48 +1924,49 @@ ssh_keysign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, error("%s: fflush: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } - if (pipe(to) < 0) { + if (pipe(to) == -1) { error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } - if (pipe(from) < 0) { + if (pipe(from) == -1) { error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } - if ((pid = fork()) < 0) { + if ((pid = fork()) == -1) { error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } - osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); + osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); if (pid == 0) { - /* keep the socket on exec */ - fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 0); - permanently_drop_suid(getuid()); close(from[0]); - if (dup2(from[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) + if (dup2(from[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(to[1]); - if (dup2(to[0], STDIN_FILENO) < 0) + if (dup2(to[0], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(from[1]); close(to[0]); - /* Close everything but stdio and the socket */ - for (i = STDERR_FILENO + 1; i < sock; i++) - close(i); + + if (dup2(sock, STDERR_FILENO + 1) == -1) + fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + sock = STDERR_FILENO + 1; + fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 0); /* keep the socket on exec */ closefrom(sock + 1); + debug3("%s: [child] pid=%ld, exec %s", __func__, (long)getpid(), _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN); - execl(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, (char *) 0); + execl(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, (char *)NULL); fatal("%s: exec(%s): %s", __func__, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, strerror(errno)); } close(from[1]); close(to[0]); + sock = STDERR_FILENO + 1; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* send # of sock, data to be signed */ - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sock) != 0) || + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sock)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, data, datalen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (ssh_msg_send(to[1], version, b) == -1) @@ -1534,7 +1981,7 @@ ssh_keysign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, } errno = 0; - while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) { + while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { if (errno != EINTR) { error("%s: waitpid %ld: %s", __func__, (long)pid, strerror(errno)); @@ -1561,23 +2008,22 @@ ssh_keysign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, sigp, lenp)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); fail: - signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); + ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); sshbuf_free(b); return -1; } - signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); + ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); sshbuf_free(b); return 0; } -int -userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) +static int +userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh) { - struct ssh *ssh = active_state; + Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt; struct sshkey *private = NULL; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; - const char *service; u_char *sig = NULL, *keyblob = NULL; char *fp = NULL, *chost = NULL, *lname = NULL; size_t siglen = 0, keylen = 0; @@ -1605,13 +2051,11 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) private = NULL; for (i = 0; i < authctxt->sensitive->nkeys; i++) { if (authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] == NULL || - authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 || authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_UNSPEC) continue; if (match_pattern_list( sshkey_ssh_name(authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]), - authctxt->active_ktype, - strlen(authctxt->active_ktype), 0) != 1) + authctxt->active_ktype, 0) != 1) continue; /* we take and free the key */ private = authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]; @@ -1641,7 +2085,8 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp); /* figure out a name for the client host */ - if ((lname = get_local_name(packet_get_connection_in())) == NULL) { + lname = get_local_name(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh)); + if (lname == NULL) { error("%s: cannot get local ipaddr/name", __func__); goto out; } @@ -1650,9 +2095,6 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) xasprintf(&chost, "%s.", lname); debug2("%s: chost %s", __func__, chost); - service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" : - authctxt->service; - /* construct data */ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); @@ -1665,9 +2107,9 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, service)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || - (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key_ssh_name(private))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name(private))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->local_user)) != 0) { @@ -1678,13 +2120,8 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif - if (authctxt->sensitive->external_keysign) - r = ssh_keysign(private, &sig, &siglen, - sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)); - else if ((r = sshkey_sign(private, &sig, &siglen, - sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), datafellows)) != 0) - debug("%s: sshkey_sign: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - if (r != 0) { + if ((r = ssh_keysign(ssh, private, &sig, &siglen, + sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b))) != 0) { error("sign using hostkey %s %s failed", sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp); goto out; @@ -1693,7 +2130,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, key_ssh_name(private))) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, sshkey_ssh_name(private))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, chost)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->local_user)) != 0 || @@ -1705,10 +2142,8 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) success = 1; out: - if (sig != NULL) { - explicit_bzero(sig, siglen); - free(sig); - } + if (sig != NULL) + freezero(sig, siglen); free(keyblob); free(lname); free(fp); @@ -1805,20 +2240,22 @@ static char * authmethods_get(void) { Authmethod *method = NULL; - Buffer b; + struct sshbuf *b; char *list; + int r; - buffer_init(&b); + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) { if (authmethod_is_enabled(method)) { - if (buffer_len(&b) > 0) - buffer_append(&b, ",", 1); - buffer_append(&b, method->name, strlen(method->name)); + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", + sshbuf_len(b) ? "," : "", method->name)) != 0) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } - buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1); - list = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b)); - buffer_free(&b); + if ((list = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__); + sshbuf_free(b); return list; } - |