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authorLinux Build Service Account <lnxbuild@localhost>2023-06-07 17:30:05 -0700
committerLinux Build Service Account <lnxbuild@localhost>2023-06-07 17:30:05 -0700
commit4b1a56904ffaeaba1beb00b8449d88625879232e (patch)
tree4162e52ce313236e90778ff33902a21674bb82c7 /security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/BootloaderStateTest.cpp
parente0e0f04e4e2e35544b69d201dc76a66207832535 (diff)
parent0786ab71425f1021f118b461ede72a4d6727a9f6 (diff)
Merge 0786ab71425f1021f118b461ede72a4d6727a9f6 on remote branch
Change-Id: I3cdb3f7443c4ee7361dc9a79a15122e8dd1340f8
Diffstat (limited to 'security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/BootloaderStateTest.cpp')
-rw-r--r--security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/BootloaderStateTest.cpp145
1 files changed, 109 insertions, 36 deletions
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/BootloaderStateTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/BootloaderStateTest.cpp
index 723edeef3d..54f187c611 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/BootloaderStateTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/BootloaderStateTest.cpp
@@ -21,7 +21,11 @@
#include <string>
#include <vector>
+#include <android-base/properties.h>
#include <android/binder_manager.h>
+#include <fstab/fstab.h>
+#include <libavb/libavb.h>
+#include <libavb_user/avb_ops_user.h>
#include <remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h>
#include "KeyMintAidlTestBase.h"
@@ -34,49 +38,118 @@ using ::std::vector;
// Since this test needs to talk to KeyMint HAL, it can only run as root. Thus,
// bootloader can not be locked.
-class BootloaderStateTest : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
+class BootloaderStateTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {
public:
virtual void SetUp() override {
- ::ndk::SpAIBinder binder(AServiceManager_waitForService(GetParam().c_str()));
- keyMint_ = IKeyMintDevice::fromBinder(binder);
- ASSERT_TRUE(keyMint_) << "Failed to get KM device";
+ KeyMintAidlTestBase::SetUp();
+
+ // Generate a key with attestation.
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ AuthorizationSet keyDesc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ auto result = GenerateKey(keyDesc, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+ // If factory provisioned attestation key is not supported by Strongbox,
+ // then create a key with self-signed attestation and use it as the
+ // attestation key instead.
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX &&
+ result == ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED) {
+ result = GenerateKeyWithSelfSignedAttestKey(
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .AttestKey()
+ .SetDefaultValidity(), /* attest key params */
+ keyDesc, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+
+ // Parse attested AVB values.
+ X509_Ptr cert(parse_cert_blob(cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(cert.get());
+
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = get_attestation_record(cert.get());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(attest_rec);
+
+ auto error = parse_root_of_trust(attest_rec->data, attest_rec->length, &attestedVbKey_,
+ &attestedVbState_, &attestedBootloaderState_,
+ &attestedVbmetaDigest_);
+ ASSERT_EQ(error, ErrorCode::OK);
}
- std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice> keyMint_;
+ vector<uint8_t> attestedVbKey_;
+ VerifiedBoot attestedVbState_;
+ bool attestedBootloaderState_;
+ vector<uint8_t> attestedVbmetaDigest_;
};
// Check that attested bootloader state is set to unlocked.
-TEST_P(BootloaderStateTest, IsUnlocked) {
- // Generate a key with attestation.
- AuthorizationSet keyDesc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
- .AttestationChallenge("foo")
- .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
- .Digest(Digest::NONE)
- .SetDefaultValidity();
- KeyCreationResult creationResult;
- auto kmStatus = keyMint_->generateKey(keyDesc.vector_data(), std::nullopt, &creationResult);
- ASSERT_TRUE(kmStatus.isOk());
-
- vector<Certificate> key_cert_chain = std::move(creationResult.certificateChain);
-
- // Parse attested AVB values.
- const auto& attestation_cert = key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate;
- X509_Ptr cert(parse_cert_blob(attestation_cert));
- ASSERT_TRUE(cert.get());
-
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attest_rec = get_attestation_record(cert.get());
- ASSERT_TRUE(attest_rec);
-
- vector<uint8_t> key;
- VerifiedBoot attestedVbState;
- bool attestedBootloaderState;
- vector<uint8_t> attestedVbmetaDigest;
- auto error = parse_root_of_trust(attest_rec->data, attest_rec->length, &key, &attestedVbState,
- &attestedBootloaderState, &attestedVbmetaDigest);
- ASSERT_EQ(error, ErrorCode::OK);
- ASSERT_FALSE(attestedBootloaderState) << "This test runs as root. Bootloader must be unlocked.";
+TEST_P(BootloaderStateTest, BootloaderIsUnlocked) {
+ ASSERT_FALSE(attestedBootloaderState_)
+ << "This test runs as root. Bootloader must be unlocked.";
+}
+
+// Check that verified boot state is set to "unverified", i.e. "orange".
+TEST_P(BootloaderStateTest, VbStateIsUnverified) {
+ // Unlocked bootloader implies that verified boot state must be "unverified".
+ ASSERT_EQ(attestedVbState_, VerifiedBoot::UNVERIFIED)
+ << "Verified boot state must be \"UNVERIFIED\" aka \"orange\".";
+
+ // AVB spec stipulates that bootloader must set "androidboot.verifiedbootstate" parameter
+ // on the kernel command-line. This parameter is exposed to userspace as
+ // "ro.boot.verifiedbootstate" property.
+ auto vbStateProp = ::android::base::GetProperty("ro.boot.verifiedbootstate", "");
+ ASSERT_EQ(vbStateProp, "orange")
+ << "Verified boot state must be \"UNVERIFIED\" aka \"orange\".";
+}
+
+// Following error codes from avb_slot_data() mean that slot data was loaded
+// (even if verification failed).
+static inline bool avb_slot_data_loaded(AvbSlotVerifyResult result) {
+ switch (result) {
+ case AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_OK:
+ case AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_ERROR_VERIFICATION:
+ case AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_ERROR_ROLLBACK_INDEX:
+ case AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_RESULT_ERROR_PUBLIC_KEY_REJECTED:
+ return true;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
+// Check that attested vbmeta digest is correct.
+TEST_P(BootloaderStateTest, VbmetaDigest) {
+ AvbSlotVerifyData* avbSlotData;
+ auto suffix = fs_mgr_get_slot_suffix();
+ const char* partitions[] = {nullptr};
+ auto avbOps = avb_ops_user_new();
+
+ // For VTS, devices run with vendor_boot-debug.img, which is not release key
+ // signed. Use AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_FLAGS_ALLOW_VERIFICATION_ERROR to bypass avb
+ // verification errors. This is OK since we only care about the digest for
+ // this test case.
+ auto result = avb_slot_verify(avbOps, partitions, suffix.c_str(),
+ AVB_SLOT_VERIFY_FLAGS_ALLOW_VERIFICATION_ERROR,
+ AVB_HASHTREE_ERROR_MODE_EIO, &avbSlotData);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(avb_slot_data_loaded(result)) << "Failed to load avb slot data";
+
+ // Unfortunately, bootloader is not required to report the algorithm used
+ // to calculate the digest. There are only two supported options though,
+ // SHA256 and SHA512. Attested VBMeta digest must match one of these.
+ vector<uint8_t> digest256(AVB_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ vector<uint8_t> digest512(AVB_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+ avb_slot_verify_data_calculate_vbmeta_digest(avbSlotData, AVB_DIGEST_TYPE_SHA256,
+ digest256.data());
+ avb_slot_verify_data_calculate_vbmeta_digest(avbSlotData, AVB_DIGEST_TYPE_SHA512,
+ digest512.data());
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE((attestedVbmetaDigest_ == digest256) || (attestedVbmetaDigest_ == digest512))
+ << "Attested digest does not match computed digest.";
}
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(BootloaderStateTest);